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Abstract:
Zahavi offers a model of ‘I’, You and We consciousness that is grounded in the
transcendentality of a minimal pre-reflective self-awareness , which he calls ‘for-meness’.
Zahavi’s formulation of transcendental self-belonging as ‘for me-ness’ relies on the notion of 
a felt non-changing self- identity accompanying all intentional experiences.  Zahavi’s
treatment of the subject and object poles of experience as, respectively,  self-inhering
internality and externality, makes of  self-awareness an alienating opposition between a
purely self-identical felt for-meness and  an external  object, a  fracture between self-identity
and otherness.I argue  that for Husserl the pure ego’s unchanging in-itself identity over time
is merely an anonymous  zero point of activity and is not felt or sensed, and thus there is no
experienced for-meness to self-awareness. There is instead a relation of ownness between the
ego and the object pole, consisting of a constant, that is, essential, underlying structural
feature of the ego’s changing relation to objects of intentional acts. I believe that this essential
structural intimacy of associative relationship between the noetic and noematic poles of
intentional constitution is what Husserl is attempting to capture when he characterizes the
constitution of the subject's stream of lived-experience in terms of ‘my ownness’. Zahavi
thinks that what gives an intended object its ‘mineness’ is the fact that as foreign to me, it is
intended by a ‘me’ that is familiar with itself. But this self-familiarity’ speaks only of my
proximity to myself as pure self-identity, not of my proximity to my world. Husserl’s notion
of ‘ownness’  understands the subject-object relation not as fracture between self-identity and
otherness (“a ruptured structure which is completely foreign to its nature“) but as an intimate
synthetic unification and belonging. Heidegger makes an even more radical break with
Cartesianism  by  replacing the subject object structure of intentionality with the  self-world
temporal structure of Dasein. In different ways , Husserl’s concept of ‘ownness’ and
Heidegger’s notion of ‘ownmost’ capture the profound intimacy of relation between self and
world that reveals itself after Zahavi’s idealized internal-external binary has been
deconstructed.
Introduction
Zahavi offers a model of  ‘I’, You and We consciousness that is grounded in the transcendentality
of a minimal pre-reflective self-awareness  . Referencing  Nagel’s argument that there is
something it is like to be a conscious entity,  Zahavi insists that consciousness of anything 
always includes a dimension of ‘for-meness’. In attempting to account for the subjective
dimension of awareness, Zahavi argues that the for-meness of consciousness in its most
primordial form manifests as a self-affecting pre-reflective minimal self-awareness. He  contrasts
this subjective self-experience with the apprehension of objects. In the latter act, I attend to,
intend, reflect or introspect on an entity. In doing so, the world that I experience appears to me
over a divide, is indirect, mediated, alienated. 
Zahavi(2005) says he is among those phenomenologists who “deny that the type of
self-consciousness entailed by phenomenal consciousness is intentionally structured, that is, a
question of a subject–object relation”. “Any convincing theory of consciousness has to respect
the difference between our consciousness of an object, and our consciousness of our own
subjectivity, and must be able to explain the distinction between intentionality, which is
characterized by a difference between the subject and the object of experience, and 
self-awareness, which implies some form of identity.”(Zahavi 2004)
Zahavi(2005) argues that treating self-awareness as its own intentional object amounts to
reflecting back on it.   As reflection,  object consciousness  is characterized “by an internal
division, difference, and alterity”. In reflection “the I qua first-person singular effectuates and
suffers a kind of inner pluralization,  a dividing self-alienation, in which it distances itself from
itself. (Asemissen 1958–59, 262).
Zahavi(2014) says “ the experiential self should be identified with the ubiquitous dimension of
first-personal character. Although it is not a separately existing entity, it is not reducible to any
specific experience, but can be shared by a multitude of changing experiences (p.72-77). “
“Normally, the “what it is like” aspect is taken to designate experiential properties. If, however,
our experiences are to have qualities of their own, they must be qualities over and above
whatever qualities the intentional object has. It is exactly the silk that is red, and not my
perception of it. Likewise, it is the lemon that is bitter, and not my experience of it.” (Zahavi
2005)
While Zahavi finds inconsistent  support in Husserl’s work  for his model of minimal ‘for-
meness’, Zahavi appreciates  phenomenologist Michel Henry’s  unwavering insistence that pre-
reflective self-awareness is a non-ecstatic and radical other  to object consciousness.
Zahavi (1999) approvingly paraphrases Henry:
 “Unless  phenomenology were able to show that there is in fact a decisive and radical difference
between  the phenomenality of constituted objects and the phenomenality of constituting subjectivity, 
i.e., a radical difference between object-manifestation and self-manifestation, its entire project 
would be threatened.”
“Henry conceives of this self-affection as a purely interior and self-sufficient occurrence  
involving no difference, distance or mediation between that which affects and that which is  
affected. It is immediate, both in the sense that the self-affection takes place without being  
mediated by the world, but also in the sense that it is neither temporally delayed nor  
retentionally mediated. It is in short an event which is strictly non-horizontal and non- 
ecstatic.”
“Henry does acknowledge that an analysis of subjectivity confronts us with an ontological dualism:
in every experience  something is given to absolute subjectivity which is different from subjectivity
itself.” “To speak of an ontological dualism, to distinguish a pure interiority and a pure exteriority, is
by no means to accept a classical Cartesian dualism. It is merely to insist upon the existence of an
absolute dimension of subjective self-manifestation, without  which no hetero-manifestation would
be possible.”
On the other hand, Zahavi(2005) (See also Gallagher and Zahavi 2014) departs from the
staunchly irrelational character of Henry’s account of time consciousness in recognizing that
there is a co-determinative relation between subject and object poles of intentionality. Self-
affection is permeated by hetero-affection. 
“Although these two sides can be distinguished conceptually, they cannot be separated. It is not as if
the two sides or aspects of phenomenal experience can be detached and encountered in isolation from
one other. When I touch the cold surface of a refrigerator, is the sensation of coldness that I then feel a
property of the experienced object or a property of the experience of the object? The correct answer is
that the sensory experience contains two dimensions, namely one of the sensing and one of the sensed,
and that we can focus on either.”
In addition to Henry’s work, Zahavi finds further support of his model of minimal self-
consciousness in  Husserl’s Ideas II, among other writings, where the pure ego is depicted as
unchanging and immutable.
Husserl says:
“We can discern with evidence the sense in which the pure Ego changes in the changing of its acts. It
is changeable in its practices, in its activities and passivities, in its being attracted and being repulsed,
etc. But these changes do not change it itself. On the contrary, in itself the pure Ego is immutable.” 
“...the pure Ego is given in  absolute selfhood and in a unity which does not present itself by  way of
adumbrations; it can be grasped adequately in the  reflexive shift of focus that goes back to it as a
center of  functioning. “( Ideas  II)
“...the primal "I,"the ego of my epoche, ...can never lose its uniqueness and personal
indeclinability.”(Crisis)
But one must ask at this point, does this immutable, indeclinable  pure ego contribute its own 
affective content to experience, a feeling of familiarity or meness, as Zahavi claims? After all,
Husserl argues that  “As pure Ego it does not harbor any hidden inner richness; it is absolutely
simple and it lies there absolutely clear. All richness lies in the cogito and in the mode of the
function which can be adequately grasped therein.”(Ideas II). Husserl describes  this pure ego
pole as non-perceivable, non-graspable and anonymous. “...the ego which is the counterpart
(gegenüber) to everything is anonymous. “ This suggests that  for Husserl, the pure ego may
function as nothing but an empty zero point or center of activity rather than a consciously sensed
feeling of any kind. 
“...it is the center whence all conscious life emits rays and receives them; it is the center of all affects
and actions, of all attention, grasping, relating, and connecting, of all theoretical, valuing, and
practical position-taking, of all enjoyment and distress, of all hope and fear, of all doing and suffering,
etc. In other words, all the multi-formed particularities of intentional relatedness to Objects, which
here are called acts, have their necessary terminus a quo, the Ego-point, from which they
irradiate.”(Ideas II)
My claim in this paper is that for  Husserl   the pure ego’s unchanging in-itself identity as inner
time consciousness  is not  felt or sensed, either explicitly or implicitly, and thus minimal pre-
reflective self-awareness generates no for-meness in the way that Zahavi conceives it. There is
instead  a relation of ownness  between  the ego and the object pole, consisting of a constant, that
is, essential, underlying structural feature of the ego’s changing relation to objects of intentional
acts .
The Bernau Manuscripts and Self-Awareness:  
I think Husserl’s  modification of his previous account  of time consciousness in the Bernau
manuscripts  is relevant in this regard. It not only challenges Zahavi’s understanding of
pre-reflective self-awareness as a non-mediated self -identity , but I believe it accurately captures
the direction of thinking Husserl was to maintain the rest of his career. More importantly, it
clarifies and advances a thinking that was his from the start , a thinking that doesn’t simply make
a ‘category error’ as Zahavi claims. by treating primary self awareness as object consciousness,
but departs from Zahavi’s understanding of both the noetic and noematic aspects of
consciousness.
By 1917 Husserl’s writing on time consciousness began to treat primal impression as inseparable 
from the retentional-protentional flow of time constitution rather than as occupying its own
present moment of meaning within the temporal stream. Passive anticipatory fulfillment from the 
subjective, egoic side co-motivates alongside the affective pull of the objective, primal  
hyletic side of every concrete experience.  
Gallagher(2017)writes “primal impression, rather than being portrayed as  an experiential origin,
“the primal source of all further consciousness and being” (Husserl 1966a:  67), is considered the
result of an interplay between retention and protention. Thus, in the Bernau  Manuscripts, Husserl
defines primal impression as “the boundary between […] the retentions  and protentions” (Husserl
2001).
Husserl seems to suggest that the complicated interlacing of retentions and protentions is
constitutive of primal impression. Not only is primal impression not self-sufficient, it is a
constituted product rather than something that makes a constitutive contribution of its own. This
more radical claim is expressed in Husserl’s idea that the initial event of experience is the empty
anticipation.” 
“ First there is an empty expectation, and then there is the point of the primary perception, itself  
an intentional experience. But the primary presentation [or impression] comes to be in the flow  
only by occurring as the fulfillment of contents relative to the preceding empty intentions,  
thereby changing itself into primal presenting perception.” (Husserl 2001; translated in  
Gallagher & Zahavi 2014)
The primal impression comes on the scene as the fulfilment of an  empty protention; the now, as
the present phase of consciousness, is constituted by way of a  protentional fulfilment (Husserl
2001).  
Zahavi wants to equate temporalization with self-awareness but not in the way that Husserl in the
Bernau  manuscripts does.  He wants it to be a  pure self-affection above and beyond its
intentional relation to an object, whereas in the Bernau manuscripts  Husserl argues that
self-awareness is always already  a self-othering. Therefore, Zahavi(2004) didn’t hold back in his
disagreement with Husserl over the Bernau Time Consciousness manuscript :
“...I do not think the internal object interpretation offers us a satisfactory account of either
time-constitution nor of self-awareness. To be even more condemning: I think that the 
position that is developed in text nr.  and elsewhere demonstrates an astonishing confusion, an
inability to properly distinguish quite different constitutive contexts.”
“When self-affection is conceived as an ecstatic and self-transcending process it is furnished with a
ruptured structure which is completely foreign to its nature.”
“... prior to reflection there is no awareness of internal objects and there is no distinction between the
lived self-manifestation of the experiences and the flow of inner time-consciousness. Inner
time-consciousness simply is the name of the pre-reflective self-awareness of our experiences.”
For-Meness and Ownness:
In the Bernau manuscripts, Husserl grounds the affectively sensed ego  in the object intentionality
of time consciousness. While Zahavi believes that there are many points in   Husserl’s writing
career where he expounds an account of pre-reflective self-consciousness compatible with
Zahavi’s, in the Bernau manuscript he feels Husserl strays into an internal object morass. Zahavi
believes that this formulation substitutes an alienating, mediated object intentionality of a
retention-presentation-protentional streaming for the direct immediate awareness of self. But I
would like to offer an alternative reading of  the triadic structure of time consciousness that
departs from Zahavi’s depiction of it as an alienating internal fracture between subject and object
pole.   
Zahavi supports the idea of  the nowness of the present as  differentiated within itself. He
recognizes that the present is not properly understood as an isolated ‘now' point; it involves not
just the current event but also the prior context framing the new entity. We don't hear sequences of
notes in a piece of music as isolated tones but recognize them as elements of an unfolding context.
As James(1978)wrote:”...earlier and later are present to each other in an experience that feels
either only on condition of feeling both together” (p.77).
The key question is how  this ‘both together' is to be construed. Is the basis of change within a
bodily organization, interpersonal interaction, and even the phenomenal experience of time itself, 
the function of an opposition between an intrinsic subjectivity  and extrinsic objects?  Or does my
dynamic ‘now' consist of a very different form of intentionality, a strange intersecting of a
projecting subject and presenting object already changed by each other, radically interbled or
inter-affected such that it can no longer be said that they have any separable aspects at all?  I
contend that Zahavi conceives the  ‘both-together' of the pairing of subject and object poles as a
conjunction of distinct self-inherences. I am not suggesting that these poles are considered as
unrelated, only that they each are presumed to carve out their own identities. At  the most
primordial level of constitution, the self pole maintains itself as an affective, or felt,  pure
self-identity which does not change with changing intentional experiences. The object pole, by
contrast, subsists as a rigid identity. 
“Self-affection understood as the process of affecting and being affected is not the rigid self-identity of
an object, but a subjective movement. A  movement which Henry has even described as the
self-temporalisation of subjectivity. But as  he then adds, we are dealing with a quite unique form of
temporalisation, which is absolute  immanent, non-horizontal and non-ecstatic. We are dealing with an
affective temporality,  and even though it seems to involve a perpetual movement and change, nothing
is changed. In  fact, it would be wrong to characterize absolute subjectivity as a stream of
consciousness. There  is no streaming and no change, but always one and the same Living Present
without distance  or difference. It is always the same self affecting itself.” 
At higher levels of constitution ,  the ego pole‘s identity  changes contingently  along  with
changing experience. At all levels, however, Zahavi(1999) treats both the subjective and the
objective sides of intentionality as   identities before they are poles of a relation. I have argued that
Zahavi’s formulation of transcendental self-belonging as ‘for me-ness’ relies on the notion of  a 
non-changing self- identity alienated from the intentional objects it is paired with.  I believe he
would do better to treat Husserl’s notion of  ‘my  ownness’  not as a fracture between self-identity
and otherness (“a ruptured structure which is completely foreign to its nature“) but as an essential
structure of intimate synthetic unification and belonging.    
Central to Zahavi’s notion of the object is the belief that, at levels of constitution beyond the pure
self identity of minimal self-awareness,   subjective context and objective sense reciprocally
determine each other as an oppositional relation or communication between contingent 
self-inhering contents. By contrast, I am arguing that for Husserl the ‘now’ structure of a
construed event is not an intertwining relation between self-inhering  interiority and exteriority, 
but a radical differential intersection implicating a different understanding of psychological
movement; intentional object and background context are not adjacent regions(a within and a
without) in space or time; they have already been contaminated by each other such that they are
inseparably co-implied as a single edge or point of intersection . The current context of an event is
not a system of relations between a for-itself  internality and an in-itself externality, but an
indivisible gesture of passage, a referential differential axis. 
Zahavi has succeeded in reducing materialist physicalism to fundamental co-dependency, 
but still finds it necessary to root intentional processes in a foundation of temporary self-inhering 
essences.   Because he treats this relation between the sensing and the sensed as a pairing of only
partially reduced identities, he renders the intentional act as alienating and mediate in comparison
with the supposed immediacy of self-affection.
 Husserl offers a foreignness to self that manifests itself as a thematic belonging to self whose
self-similarity presupposes and is built from this irreducible foreignness. He introduces a
primordial motivational principle in which noetic anticipatory assimilation  dominates the 
foreignness of the noematic object pole. This peculiarly intimate ‘foreignness'  must be
understood in different terms than that of the alienating fracture of objective exteriority. It is not a
privileging of the same over the different ,  but rather a situating of the binary ‘same-different’ in
a more insubstantial and therefore more intimate space of relationship than that of the alienating
relation between an intrinsic subjectivity and an extrinsic object. 
Husserl says actual  being is constituted originally by harmoniousness of experience  as a
synthetic unity inseparable from my life and its potentialities. Each intentional sense is “a point  of
intersection  belonging to my constitutive synthesis”(CM). Furthermore,  this constitutive
synthesis achieves its harmoniousness on the basis of the associative belongingness between the
constituting  and constituted poles, as a unity of identification, homogeneity, similarity, likeness. 
It “points back  to such experiences of the same intended object or a similar one.” In this fashion
the ego constitutes progressively higher levels of  ownness from  primordial constitutive ownness.
I believe that this essential structural intimacy of associative relationship between the noetic and
noematic poles of  intentional constitution is what Husserl is attempting to capture when he
characterizes the constitution of the subject's stream of  lived-experience in terms of ‘my
ownness’. I don’t think that Husserl would have chosen to describe intentional objects in general
as being constituted ‘within’, ‘inside’ , as ‘a part of’, ‘internal to’  my  ego, as ‘its very own’ if he
meant for  the ego pole to function as merely  a  ‘harbor’ for alienated othernesses as Zahavi
claims. 
We see the centrality of similarity manifest itself at all levels of constitution, in the subjective
achievement of  synthetic unities, analogical apperceptive pairing,  associative relationality,
correlations, harmonious fulfillments, subjective ‘mineness’, variations, flowing multiplicities, 
congruities, nexuses, coherences, etc.  At the the highest constituted level of intersubjective
experience,  each subjectivity interacts with other subjectivities via their own integral thread of
continuous unified experience. Consistent with his subjectivity-based sociality, Husserl’s later
writings on ethics is personalistic, striving toward an optimal self-consistency of all subjective
values at the highest level.  The intersubjective sphere  is founded on my aperceptive constitution
in empathy of the alter ego.  In this apperceptive pairing, my self perception and my apperception
of an alter ego “found phenomenologically a unity of similarity” (Cartesian Meditations, p.112)).
  At the  level of the constitution of objects within my own sphere of ownness, where  the
adumbrating intentionality proceeds  in an objectifying instinct,  this striving is founded in an
interest in the  enrichment of the self [of the object] ), as a unified nexus of appresentations .
“Every apperception in which we apprehend at a glance, and noticingly grasp, objects given
beforehand- for example, the already-given everyday world- every apperception in which we
understand their sense and its horizons forthwith, points back to a "primal instituting", in which an
object with a similar sense became constituted for the first time. Even the physical things 
of this world that are unknown to us are, to speak generally, known in respect of their type. We have
already seen like things before, though not precisely this thing here.  Thus each everyday experience
involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective sense to a new case, with its
anticipative apprehension of the object as having a similar sense. To the extent that there is givenness
beforehand, there is such a transfer.“ (Cartesian Meditations, p.111)
Grounding these higher constituting achievements is the central role of similarity at the lowest
stratum of passive pre-rational  primal association.  “ Once a connection is formed in a stream of
consciousness, there then exists in this stream the tendency for a newly emerging connection,
similar to a portion of the earlier one, to continue in the direction of the similarity and to strive to
complete itself in a total nexus similar to the  previous total nexus.”(Ideas II, p.234).
“...consciousness is connected in the most general way to another consciousness by a commonality that is
correlatively noetic and noematic; and all connection is connection through "commonality." through 
uniformity and similarity.”(Passive and Active Synth, p.485)
Underlying and founding all these strata  is  the assimilative basis of temporal constitution.
Protention and retention are included in what Husserl calls a “universal drive intentionality
(Treibintentionalität).” As Bernet(2010) says “ this originary process, as a life-process, is not
simply an automatic process; it has a goal and the tendency to draw near to this goal.”
It  is not simply that Husserl claims protension as a general going beyond itself of one’s experience
of an object, rather that this going beyond itself has the character of a peculiar implicative
consistency.  Even in difference, negation, senselessness, irrationality, alterity,  there is no
experience in consciousness that is not in an overarching way variation on a   thematics for
Husserl, a similarity-in-difference.
The radical intimacy referentially, linking one moment of experience to the next, is driven not by
the positivity of an idealist subjectivity, but, on the contrary,  by the insubstantiality of both the
presencing and absencing poles of each absolutely new element of experience. The always novel
altering repetition of experience has not the power to disturb to the same extent as it lacks, each
time, the centering thickness of interiorized content.  The formidability of ideal self-identity is
necessary to impose the arbitrariness of polarizing conditioning  on the movement of experiential
process. When the irreducible origin of meaning is thought in terms of the meeting of “an
ontological dualism, to distinguish a pure interiority and a pure exteriority”, fracture and alienation
are irreducible in its temporalization.
Zahavi(2015) thinks that what gives an intended object its ‘mineness’ is the fact that as foreign to
me, it is intended by a ‘me’ that is familiar with itself. He offers “...the best explanation of the
sense of familiarity with, and lack of surprise regarding, my concurrent experience is that I was
aware of it all along, in that it is built into the very phenomenal  character of the experience that it
is like something for me.” But this self-familiarity’ speaks only of my proximity to myself,  not of 
my proximity to my world. Zahavi(2009) says “... the experiences I am living through are given
differently (but not necessarily better) to me than  to anybody else.” In other words, my experiences 
are given differently to me  because my self-identical minimal self-awareness is marked with my
signature. But without an underlying  thematic, associative consistency in the temporal flow of my
experiences, they cannot be said to be given ‘better’ to me than to others.  My ego having been 
been transcendentally branded as ‘unique to me’  but lacking associative intimacy with, and thus
having no unique ownership over,  intentional objects, Zahavi argues that “I can come to have the
same kind of experiences, thoughts, beliefs and preferences as somebody else without becoming
the other, just as somebody else can come to have the same type of experiences and beliefs as I
have without thereby becoming me.”
In contrast to this thinking. Husserl sees the ‘mineness’ of intended objects as a result of a
proximity between object and subject. That is, intended objects , as constituted senses , maintain a
relation of similarity to the intending ego. They are mine because of the way they are constituted as 
modifications, variations, assimilations to the theme that is the temporal flow of experience. There 
is a way in which new experience is like previous experience and is familiar and recognizable to
me , and belongs to me inasmuch as it elaborates my own thematics. This belonging of all my
experience to my own ongoing thematics is what brands all my  experience as unique to me, or as
Husserl says , belonging to my ownnness (Husserl(2001) says “… the  style, so to speak, of "what
is to come" is prefigured through what  has just past”). Since what belongs to my ownness
thematically, stylistically brands all my experiences as mine and distinguishes them from other
transcendental egos, pace Zahavi, I do not simply ‘come to have the same kind of experiences,
thoughts, beliefs and preferences as somebody else’. They are, instead, always given better, that is
to say,  more intimately to me than another’s experience is given to me. 
Zahavi and Husserl on the Constitution of  Intersubjectivity:
Because Zahavi equates for-meness with ideal self-familiarity, and otherness with the exteriorities
to which that immanent interiority  is opposed in an intentional act, my sphere of ownness is a
mere ‘harbor’ for othernesses which have their home at the heart of, but only alongside  my unique
subjectivity. Therefore, the transcendence of  my self-relation that alter egos represent, and the
social world of second and third personal relations which this transcendence makes possible, is
already anticipated by the self-alienating character of object intentionality at the most reductive
level.
Thus,  Zahavi(1996) claims that for Husserl “a radical implementation of the transcendental
reduction leads with necessity to a disclosure of transcendental intersubjectivity”.  Husserl insists,
however,  that a radical reduction reveals the philosophical solitude of  the absolute ego, which is
prior to the constitutive accomplishment of  transcendental intersubjectivity.
Since all  objects of my intentional acts, including my experience of my body and other selves, 
belong to me through primary or secondary apperceptive performances via dimensions of similarity
and likeness, this unique ongoing integrity of my subjective flow of experiencing makes it
impossible for me to ever have direct access to other selves, or my own body, as alien.  Thus,
contrary to Zahavi’s (2002) assertion that  “...in my corporeal existence I am intersubjective and
social from the start”, for Husserl I am never social in Zahavi’s sense of being in direct contact
with alienness . This ‘world for us’, from one to the other to the other, is constituted within
MY(the primal me) subjective process as MY privileged apperception of ‘from one to the other to
the other’.
“...one of the main tasks of pure intentional psychology is to make understandable, by way of
the progressive reduction of world-validity, the subjective and pure function through which 
the world as the "world for us all" is a world for all from my—the ego's—vantage point, with
whatever particular content it may have. ...”(Crisis, p.256) 
Primordially, the autonomy of being given to others is not directly accessible to me (me as
apodictic rather than natural empirical ego).   Rather than making  the absolute difference between
self and Other disappear, intersubjective apperception exposes this unbridgeable gap by allowing
only an interpretive mediate access to the alien, from within the singular ‘I’.
“ The epoche creates a unique sort of  philosophical solitude which is the fundamental
methodical requirement for a truly radical philosophy. In this solitude I am not  a single
individual who has somehow willfully cut himself off  from the society of mankind, perhaps
even for theoretical reasons, or who is cut off by accident, as in a shipwreck, but who  
nevertheless knows that he still belongs to that society. I am not  an ego, who still has his you,
his we, his total community of  co-subjects in natural validity. All of mankind, and the whole
distinction and ordering of the personal pronouns, has become a  phenomenon within my
epoche; and so has the privilege of I-the- man among other men. “(Crisis, p.184)
“...it was wrong, methodically, to jump immediately into transcendental inter-subjectivity and
to leap over the primal "I,"the ego of my epoche, which can never lose its uniqueness and
personal indeclinability. It is only an apparent contradiction to  this that the ego—through a
particular constitutive accomplishment of its own—makes itself declinable, for itself,
transcendentally; that, starting from itself and in itself, it constitutes  transcendental
intersubjectivity, to which it then adds itself as a  merely privileged member, namely, as "I"
among the transcendental others. This is what philosophical self-exposition in the  epoche
actually teaches us. It can show how the always singular I,  in the original constituting life
proceeding within it, constitutes a first sphere of objects, the "primordial" sphere; how it  then,
starting from this, in a motivated fashion, performs a  constitutive accomplishment through
which an intentional modification of itself and its primordiality achieves ontic validity  under
the title of "alien-perception," perception of others, of  another "I" who is for himself an I as I
am. ”(Crisis, p.185)
Zahavi argues  that Husserl’s notion of the singular ‘I’  refers to the formal structure of pre-
reflective self-awareness, its absolute self-identity. But  this determination of ownness addresses
only the ego pole,  treating  its relation to intentional objects as alienating. For Husserl, however,
my ownness is not  the formal essence of a self-identical ego, but the function  of constitutive
synthesis. Thus, not only my constituting  ego  belongs  to me, but the constituted  psychophysical
world  of direct sensation  and apperceived  objects,  as well as my apperception of other egos. 
 Within  this general belonging of all experience to my egoic processes, Husserl distinguishes
between what is peculiar to me and what is other, that is,  between primary   and secondary
spheres of ownness. What  is peculiarly my own  belongs  to me as  a synthetic unity inseparable
from the life of my ego and its potentialities. 
“Where, and so far as, the constituted unity is inseparable from the original constitution itself, with the
inseparableness that characterizes an immediate concrete oneness, not only the constitutive perceiving
but also the perceived existent belongs to my concrete very-ownness ”(Cartesian Meditations) 
What makes the  appresentation of objects an immediate concrete oneness is  the possibility of
verification by a corresponding fulfilling presentation. By contrast, the empathized  alter ego can
never be directly verified through a fulfilling presentation. This indirectness  of verification makes
my empathetic apperception of another ego a secondary transcendence with respect to  concrete
experiences belonging to my peculiar ownness. Nevertheless, my experience of others still
belongs  to me intimately on the basis of a harmonious unity of similarity and likeness that the
apperceptive pairing achieves. 
Because the constitution of egoic otherness is a secondary, higher order differentiation within my
own egoic processes, bracketing off the intersubjectively constituted objective world does not
deprive my egoic processes of any of their essential features. The coherent founding stratum of
what is included in my ownness includes what is other for me. “...every consciousness of what is 
other, every mode of appearance of it, belongs in the former sphere”[ of what is included in my 
ownness]. (Cartesian Meditations, p.100) 
“But here something remarkable strikes us : a sequence of evidences that yet, in their sequence, seem
paradoxical. The psychic life of my Ego (this "psychophysical" Ego), including my whole
world-experiencing life and therefore including my actual and possible experience of what is other, is
wholly unaffected by screening off what is other. Consequently there belongs within my psychic being
the whole constitution of the world existing for me and, in further consequence, the differentiation of
that constitution into the systems that constitute what is included in my peculiar ownness and the
systems that constitute what is other.”(Cartesian Meditations, p.98)
The distinction between what belongs to my peculiar ownness , such as my reduced perception of
objects and my own body, and what is other to me is a difference within an overarching belonging 
to self , via dimensions of likeness, of all experience. In this connection, I think it is significant
that Husserl analogizes my apperception of an alter ego to the act of recollection, which belongs 
to my peculiar ownness.
In recollection, 
“... the immediate "I" performs an accomplishment through which it constitutes
a variational mode of itself as existing (in the mode of having passed). Starting from this we can trace
how the immediate "I," flowingly-statically present, constitutes itself in self-temporalization as
enduring through “Its" pasts. In the same way, the immediate "I," already enduring in the enduring
primordial sphere, constitutes in itself another as other...Thus, in me, "another I" achieves ontic
validity as co-present [kompräsent] with his own ways of being self-evidently verified, which are
obviously quite different from those of a "sense" perception.”(Crisis, p.185)
From Husserl’s perspective, just as each element in a perceptual system gives birth, via
associative synthesis, to the rest of the system as a synthetic unfolding,  as participant in an
intersubjective community each of my motivated acts  gives birth to, that is, frames and orients,
my reciprocal interactions with others in my community. This  temporal ‘birthing’ constitutes 
intersubjectivity in such a way that my own subjective thread of continuity runs through and
organizes it.  That is to say, hidden within the naive exteriority  of my social encounters is a
peculiar sort of coherence or implicate self-consistency. However alien to me is a world of fellow
egos, each with their own subjective process, all I can ever apperceive of that otherness is what I
mediatively, non-inferentially  ‘pick out’ in  analogical similarity with my own process.
A  thread of unified internal integrity runs through my  apprehension of an intersubjectively 
interaffecting world of others.  Other egos, reducible to transcendental subjects, are not just
figments of my own constitutive process, but exist alongside my own in a system of intentional
interpretration . However, an ongoing thread of subjective continuity underlies my (and every
other ego’s) participation in interpersonal relations. My contact with another person is not a
dialogic ping pong game.  Rather than a single game, interpersonal relationality is at least two
intertwining games, from my vantage; it is both my integrally variating senses of the other's
interpretation of our encounter, and my awareness of the dynamic stability of the difference
between his and my outlook(our individual habitual histories of motivated position-taking). 
But my perspective and that of another are not to be understood as solipsistically private regions.  
The interpersonal relation directly remakes my sense of what my `own' perspective is, as well as
what I assume to be the other's integral position.  When I apperceptively ‘get inside the other's
head’, it is simultaneously they getting inside my head. It is always a new sense of `me' and `other'
that emerge in conversation, but as an intertwining correlative  movement among internally
unitary threads of implication. 
My sense of my own identity is relentlessly, but subtly, formed and reformed through direct and
indirect social engagement, but in a manner which presupposes and is made possible by the
unified synthetic continuity of my motivated history of position-taking. I can passively allow
myself to be influenced by others, but this is a superficial, ‘merely external’ type of affecting 
which does not steer  my core motivational processes.
 “What comes from others and is "taken over" by me, and is more external or less so, can be
characterized as issuing from the other subject, first of all as a tendency proceeding from him and
addressed to me, as a demand, to which I perhaps yield passively, perhaps reluctantly, but by which
I am still overpowered. Alternatively, I might annex it on my own accord, and then it becomes part
of me. In that case it no longer has the character of a mere demand to which I yield and which
determines me from the outside; it has become a position-taking that issues from my own Ego and
is not merely a stimulus coming from the outside and retaining the character of a borrowing of
something that came forth from another Ego, of something that has its primal instauration in
him.”(Ideas II, p.281))
Footnote: A number of writers have taken issue with Zahavi’s model of for-meness  as pre-social minimal
self-identity. Their arguments range from the claim that the primordial sense of self is mediated by
interpersonal influences (Ratcliffe 2017) to the more radical view that the self is entirely constructed by
interpersonal dynamics (Maclaren 2008, (McGann, and De Jaegher 2009). However, such positions
invariably maintain Zahavi’s idealized formulation of object  intentionality as a polarizing opposition
between temporarily self-inhering contents (see Soffer 2011).
Heidegger on Dasein  and Befindlichkeit: 
Earlier in this paper I distinguished Husserl’s notion of ‘my ownness’ from Zahavi’s concept of 
‘for-meness’. The former, I argued , characterized the primordial ego’s radical solitude as a
function of an essential structural unity inhering in all its acts, harmonizing the moments of the
temporal flow via likeness and similarity.  This essential relational intimacy between subject and
object poles only reveals itself when these poles are divested of the intrinsic interior ( for-meness)
and exterior(alien object) content that Zahavi attributes to them. 
If Husserl demonstrated the radical interdependency of subject and object , Heidegger’s
questioning of  the being of beings sought to locate a more primordial and integral ground than
that of subject-object relationality. To show how far Heidegger’s conception of the self strays
from Zahavi’s account of subjectivity, I want to compare  Zahavi’s reading of Heidegger with my
own. 
Zahavi(2005) says: 
“...it seems reasonable to conclude that Heidegger did, in fact, operate with a form of self-acquaintance
that precedes reflection.   When understanding his claim that no self-acquaintance can occur
independently of, or prior to, our world-disclosure, it is crucial to remember that this world-disclosure
contains a dimension of self from the very start and, as well, that it cannot occur independently of or
prior to a disclosure of self.”
“...on Heidegger's account every experience involves a primitive sense of self; every experience is
characterized by the fact that “I am always somehow acquainted with myself” (Zahavi 2009)
 Zahavi isn’t suggesting that Heidegger’s ‘primitive sense of self’ is a non-ecstatic and
self-identical  self-awareness, only that a self-aware subject pole ( albeit not pure and detached)
belongs to every intentional experience. 
Heidegger(1982) would seem to concur with Zahavi:
“To intentionality belongs, not only a self-directing-toward and not only an understanding of the
being of the being toward which it is directed, but also the associated unveiling of the self which is
comporting itself here. Formally, it is unassailable to speak of the ego as consciousness of
something that is at the same time conscious of itself.”
But he then adds the following warning:
... . But these formal determinations, which provide the framework for idealism’s dialectic of
consciousness, are nevertheless very far from an interpretation of the phenomenal circumstances of
the Dasein, from how this being shows itself to itself in its factual existence, if violence is not
practiced on the Dasein by preconceived notions of ego and subject drawn from the theory of
knowledge.”
How, then  does the being of Dasein show itself in its factual existence? I think it is a
misunderstanding to equate Dasein with the subject  pole of a subject-object structure. In the first
place , Heidegger does not view Dasein from the vantage of a subject-object binary. If one
instead speaks of self and world, then Dasein  belongs to both poles. Specifically , the self is a
constantly changing creation. It exists in unveiling itself by projecting itself on a possibility.
What it projects itself on is its world. So the self is its world as the possibility  that it  projects
itself into. Put differently , the self is the tripartite structure of  temporality as the past
anticipating itself into the future. 
For Heidegger(1982), temporality as pure self-affection is not the essence of subjectivity but the
essence of Dasein, which is not a subjectivity but what lies in between the subjective and the
objective.
“The Dasein does not need a special kind of observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of
espionage on the ego in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein gives itself over immediately
and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things. This is not mysticism 
and does not presuppose the assigning of souls to things. It is only a reference to an elementary
phenomenological fact of existence, which must be seen prior to all talk, no matter how acute, about
the subject-object relation.” 
 “To say that the world is subjective is to say that it belongs to the Dasein so far as this being is in 
the mode of being-in-the-world. The world is something which the “subject” “projects outward,” 
as it were, from within itself. But are we permitted to speak here of an inner and an outer? What 
can this projection mean? Obviously not that the world is a piece of myself in the sense of some 
other thing present in me as in a thing and that I throw the world out of this subject thing in order 
to catch hold of the other things with it. Instead, the Dasein itself is as such already projected. So 
far as the Dasein exists a world is cast-forth with the Dasein’s being. To exist means, among other 
things, to cast-forth a world, and in fact in such a way that with the thrownness of this projection, 
with the factical existence of a Dasein, extant entities are always already uncovered.” 
“To understand means, more precisely, to project oneself upon a possibility, in this projection to 
keep oneself at all times in a possibility. A can-be, a possibility as possibility, is there only in 
projection, in projecting oneself upon that can-be.
… If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility, it is projecting itself in the sense that it is unveiling
itself as this can-be, in this specific being. If the Dasein projects itself upon a possibility and
understands itself in that possibility, this understanding, this becoming manifest of the self, is not a
self-contemplation in the sense that the ego would become the object of some cognition or other;
rather, the projection is the way in which I am the possibility.”
What makes this creative act of ‘absencing’ a self , an ‘ownness’, is the intimacy and continuity
of  the self moment to moment as existing as a change over its past. Heidegger understands that
to be radically, irreducibly, primordially situated in a world is to be guaranteed , at every
moment, a world that feelingly  creatively impinges on me anew as foreign in some aspect. And
it is simultaneously, to feel a belonging familiarity) to what impinges on me in its foreignness
due to the anticipative, projective futural aspect of temporality. Heidegger’s being-in -the world
is always characterized by a pragmatic self-belongingness that he articulates as a heedful
circumspective relevance that events always have for Dasein in its world. For Heidegger, self is
Dasein, Dasein is attuned understanding , attuned understanding is projection, projection is a
happening, an action, historicality, temporality, the over and beyond, self as transcendence, the
unveiling of a specific possibility.
A key feature of Heidegger’s philosophy is his placement of affect, in the guise of befindlichkeit ,
alongside understanding as the essence of dasein. Befindlichkeit reveals the  ‘how’ of  Dasein’s
relation to itself as the understanding unveiling of possibilities, the way in which Dasein is
affected by what it projects itself into. Heidegger(1982) says 
“all understanding is essentially related to an affective self-finding which belongs to understanding
itself. To be affectively self-finding is the formal structure of what we call mood, passion, affect, and
the like, which are constitutive for all comportment toward beings, although they do not by
themselves alone make such comportment possible but always only in one with understanding, which
gives its light to each mood, each passion, each affect.”“... this 'one is in such and such a way' is
not-is never-simply a consequence or side-effect of our thinking, doing, and acting. It is-to put it
crudely-the presupposition for such things, the 'medium' within which they first happen. “ 
Understanding how Heidegger accomplishes this integration of intentionality, affect and will is  
essential for grasping the radically temporal basis of Being in the world. More importantly, it
allows us to see how Zahavi’s  idealizing model of subject-object relationality not only alienates
the subjective from the objective pole but splits apart the affective and intentional aspects of
experience. It is not as if Zahavi follows first generation cognitivism in repeating ‘Descartes’
error’, to borrow Damasio’s phrase, by considering thought and feeling to be functionally
independent. On the contrary, he take pains to present emotion and thought as an indissociable
interaction. Cognitive and affective processes are closely interdependent, with affect, emotion and
sensation functioning in multiple ways and at multiple levels to situate or attune the context of our
conceptual dealings with the world , and affective tonality is never absent from cognition. As
Ratcliffe(2002) puts it, “moods are no longer a subjective window-dressing on privileged
theoretical perspectives but a background that constitutes the sense of all intentionalities, whether
theoretical or practical”(p.290). 
A comparison with Heidegger’s Befindlichkeit, however, reveals that Zahavi can  hardly be said
to have dispensed with the divide between thought and feeling. Zahavi explains that the
pre-reflective self-awareness that opposes, but is at the same time inseparably connected with
intended objects, is something of the order of a feeling rather than an intentional object. How does
Zahavi distinguish between feeling and mood on the one hand, and intentional object on the
other?
Zahavi(1999) approvingly cites  Michel Henry’s view: 
“Henry calls attention to the way in which we are aware of our feelings and moods. When we are 
in pain, anxious, embarrassed, stubborn or happy, we do not feel it through the intervention of a 
(inner) sense organ or an intentional act, but are immediately aware of it. There is no distance or 
separation between the feeling of pain or happiness and our awareness of it, since it is given in and
through itself. According to Henry, something similar holds for all of our conscious experiences. To
make use of a terminology taken from analytical philosophy of mind, Henry would claim that all
conscious experiences are essentially characterized by having a subjective ‘feel’ to them, that is, a
certain quality of ‘what it is like’”. 
In settling on feeling as a special sort of entity that does the work of generating immediate
self-awareness, Zahavi is harking back to a long-standing Western tradition whereby affective
feeling is supposedly instantaneous, non-mediated experience. It has been said that ‘raw' or
primitive feeling is bodily-physiological, pre-reflective and non-conceptual, contentless hedonic
valuation, innate, qualitative, passive, a surge, glow, twinge, energy, spark, something we are
overcome by. Opposed to such ‘bodily’, dynamical events are seemingly flat, static entities
referred to by such terms as mentation , rationality, theorization, propositionality, objectivity,
calculation, cognition, conceptualization and perception. “
Because Zahavi makes self-inhering states do most of the work of establishing the awareness 
of the affectively felt and objectively perceived sides of the bond between the subject and the 
world, the relation between subject and object becomes a mostly empty middle term, a neutral
copula added onto the two opposing sides of the binary. This reification   of subject, object and
relation as distinct entities or states unto themselves is exemplified in Zahavi’s distinction
between for-meness, meness  and mineness as the difference  between an  awareness of an
experience, an awareness of an experiencer, and an awareness of the experience as owned by the
experiencer. Only the first is supposedly primary and immediate , whereas the other two are
derived from the first in secondary and tertiary acts of reflection. 
Footnote: Zahavi 2019 explains that for me-ness is pre-reflective self-awareness , in all experience.
By contrast,  “Me-ness, in short, is when the subject   figures in experience as “an object of
phenomenal awareness” (Guillot 2017: 35), or as Farrell and McClelland  rephrase it in their
summary of Guillot’s view, as “a thing-that-appears” (2017: 3). Mineness,  finally, is when the
experience is phenomenally given as mine. On this reading, mineness is the more  complex notion,
since it not only requires that the subject is aware of her experience, and aware of herself, but also
aware of the possessive relation between herself and the experience, i.e., aware that she is owning  
the experience (Guillot 2017: 31, 43). As Guillot then points out, there is prima facie a fairly clear
distinction to be drawn between an  awareness of an experience, an awareness of an experiencer, and
an awareness of the experience as  owned by the experiencer.” 
From Heidegger’s perspective, Zahavi’s need to identify and insulate  a pure immediacy from the
alienating effect of  object intentionality is a byproduct of the  idealizing way he formulates the
issue of subjectivity, and Zahavi’s solution only reaffirms the problem, which is that movement
and transformation are treated as secondary to self-inherence, so that the affective and cognate
aspects of events are artificially split into separated entities and then have to be pieced together
again in an interaction . To ground experience in radical temporality is to abandon the concept of
subject and world in states of interaction, in favor of a self-world referential-differential in
continuous self-transforming movement. The relation, the in-between is the irreducible basis of
Dasein. 
For Heidegger, the subjective and the objective, are not primordially  understood as belonging to
an interaction between immediately felt  and mediatively given states of being; they are instead
the inseparable features of a unitary differential structure of transition, otherwise known as
Dasein’s equi-primordial temporality, attunement and understanding. There are no self-inhering
entities, either in the guise of affects  or intended objects. The awareness of the relation between
self and world is not  a secondary or tertiary derivation from a primordial  awareness of distinct
subjective and objective manifestations. On the contrary , both feeling and intentional meaning are
produced only in and  through Dasein’s projective self-world relation. From this perspective it is
Zahavi’s notions of subject and object which are derivative and secondary.  In the place of
Zahavi’s three-part structure of subjective feeling, relational bond and intentional object,
Heidegger proposes a unified totality. No relational connector is needed to tie subject and object
together when subject and object are no longer assumed as inherences. 
Dasein, Das Man and Intersubjectivity:
If Dasein’s being-in-the -world is always structured as an intimate, pragmatic self-belongingness,
how does Heidegger  explain the basis of  apparently normatively driven intersubjective ‘we’
contexts?  Heidegger’s most  systematic treatment of Dasein’s role in a linguistic community
appears in his discussion of average everydayness and das man in Being and Time.  
Zahavi is among those thinkers who interpret Heidegger’s ‘we-self’ of every day das man as
taking precedence over his authentic self of ‘ownmost’   possibilities. As das man , Zahavi claims 
“group belongingness, rather than being founded upon an other-experience, preceded any such 
experience.”
“...an everyday being-with-one-another characterized by anonymity and substitutability, where
others are those from whom “one mostly does not distinguish oneself” (Heidegger 1996: 11)
He surmises that Heidegger would approve of Schmid’s(2005) assertion that “...the we, the “sense
of us” or “plural self-awareness,” precedes the distinction between yours and mine, is prior to any
form of intersubjectivity or mutual recognition, and is itself the irreducible basis for joint action
and communication.”
Zahavi is far from alone in  interpreting Heidegger’s discussions of the discursive practices of 
Das man as assuming an introjection of  norms by a socially created self or a socially conditioned
self-affecting subjectivity. Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s model of empathy was taken by many
interpreters as evidence that the primacy of being-with for Dasein functions as the conditioning of
a self by an outside.
For instance, Rousse(2014) says 
“...the particular way I ‘carry out’ my being and relate to myself is unavoidably susceptible to the
pressures of the others’ normative expectations.””... inauthenticity is a matter of a person having his
practical orientation dominated by ‘outside forces’,...the tacitly operative normative expectations
about how one ought properly and normally to behave.” “ Dasein, as essentially ‘being-with’,
initially ‘gets’ its existential answerability by being socialized into the shared behavioral norms of
the One. In turn, this enables, even encourages, Dasein to act in accordance with them and to avoid
taking its own (‘existentiell’) answerability for how it comports and understands itself. To be
responsible, then, is to be the kind of agent who has the possibility to 
take responsibility for the socially normative determinants of identity.”
By taking for granted the notion of normativity as a shared understanding, Rousse exemplifies the
kind of thinking that Heidegger says disguises, covers over, conceals and obscures  a genuine
understanding. Das man isn’t a matter of simply acting in accordance with norms that are
communally understood but a way of thinking that pre-supposes and takes for granted, that the
self can internalize and interject meanings from others. It is not about behaving in accordance
with norms but believing that norms exist as shared entities in the first place.
Rousse misreads authenticity as a self-reflexive self’s becoming aware of what it has introjected,
‘taken in’ from culture and its attempt to take responsibility for, or embrace its own alternative to,
those norms. But for Heidegger what the self discloses to itself in average everydayness is not
introjected meanings from a community. The self never simply introjects from an outside to an
inside. The radically temporal structuration of Dasein makes such introjection impossible. 
Heidegger’s(2010)  task is to explain how a Dasein which always understands others in relation to
its ownmost aims and goals ends up believing in a cultural world of linguistic practices that
appear to be the same for all. “...what purports to be an opening up of the world is in fact its 
concealment: by appealing to public opinion and tradition, idle talk creates in Dasein the belief 
that it possesses universally acknowledged and thus genuine truths.”
Heidegger chooses words like average, vague, flattened , confused and ambiguous to describe  
Dasein’s being as Das Man, to indicate that the heedfulness of Care is still primordially and 
implicitly operative even when it is explicitly concealed and suppressed . Average everyday 
discourse has to be vague, approximate, superficial and ambiguous enough to conceal, disguise, 
cover over, miss, obscure, suppress the fact that the meaning of what is shared is never interpreted
identically for each dasein.  
“What is talked about is understood only approximately and superficially. One means the same 
thing because it is in the same averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said.”
“Publicness ” does not get to "the heart of the matter," because it is insensitive to every difference of
level and genuineness.” 
“Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the
matter. Idle talk, which everyone can snatch up, not only divests us of the task of genuine
understanding, but develops an indifferent intelligibility for which nothing is closed off any longer.
Discourse, which belongs to the essential constitution of being of Dasein, and also constitutes its
disclosedness, has the possibility of becoming idle talk, and as such of not really keeping
being-in-the-world open in an articulated understanding, but of closing it off and covering over inner
worldly beings. “ “ Ontologically, this means that when Da-sein maintains itself in idle talk, it is-as
being-in-the-world-cut off from the primary and primordially genuine relations of being toward the
world, toward Mitda-sein, toward being-in itself.” 
“Idle talk conceals simply because of its characteristic failure to address things in an originary way
[urspriinglichen Ansprechens]. It obscures the true appearance of the world and the events in it by
instituting a dominant view [herrschende Ansicht].”“Usually and for the most part the ontic mode of
being-in (discoverture) is concealment [Verdeckung]. Interpretedness, which is speech encrusted by
idle talk, draws any given Dasein into 'one's' way of being. But existence in the 'one' now entails the
concealment and marginalization of the genuine self [eigentlichen Selbst]. Not only has each
particular given itself over to 'one', 'one' blocks Dasein's access to the state it finds itself in
[Befindlichkeit].”(Heidegger 2011)
What is this genuine self, this genuine understanding, this originary and primordial way of 
appropriating the matter, this “getting to the heart of the matter”, these primordially genuine 
relations of being toward the world, toward Mitda-sein, toward being-in itself, that idle talk
conceals?
To say that in the mode of average everydayness Dasein disguises, covers over, conceals, obscures 
its genuine self, a genuine understanding, an originary and primordial way of appropriating the 
matter, “getting to the heart of the matter,” primordially genuine relations of being toward the 
world, toward Mit-dasein, toward being-in itself, is to say that Dasein explicitly experiences itself 
as a constituted self, introjecting norms from other selves , but this awareness pre-supposes and is 
grounded in an implicit mineness.
Average everydayness of Das man and idle talk shares with what Heidegger calls the ‘present to
hand‘ the  features of being derivative modes of the ‘as’ structure of heedful circumspective
significance, functioning as a contextually rich totality of relevance. They also share the feature of
being a  ‘dwindling down’ of that wider experience. 
Even as Zahavi  mistakenly critiques Heidegger for giving  precedence to “plural self-awareness,” 
over the distinction between yours and mine,  Zahavi’s I-Thou  model of sociality falls under the
scope of Heidegger’s formulation of Das Man. 
Zahavi(2012) says “ The I and the you are prior to the we”. The I-you relation “is a reciprocal
exchange of address and response that affects and transforms the self experience of the
participating individuals... we take over from others (and make our own) a language, roles,
attitudes and norms”. 
This makes individual behavior in social situations the product of narrative norms, reciprocities, 
shared practices and social constraints. The presupposition here is that my own subjectivity
always functions as a harbor in the reception of social signs . 
Intersubjectivity is characterized by a reciprocal cobbling and co-ordination between personal 
history and cultural signs in which the ‘joints' of such interactive bodily-mental and social
practices are simultaneously within my own subjectivity and common to other participants in my
community. Zahavi assumes these culturally normed practices that we  internalize represent forms
of meaning no less robust in significance and relevance to our lives  than those which we
generate.
In contrast, for Heidegger  the social norms and practices that Dasein takes in are specific
modifications of meaning on the order of a diminution of significance. The publicness  of Das
Man and the present to handness of things are modes of Dasein representing a deprivation and
trivialization of intelligibility, significance and relevance, and thus a reduction of meaningfulness.  
Dasein becomes alienated from itself not by being taken over by, introjecting and internalizing an
outside but by encountering itself (its ownmost world of possibilities) as almost devoid of sense.
This is self-alienation as senselessness rather than internalization of an other.
“However, alienation cannot mean that Da-sein is factically torn away from itself....this alienation, 
which closes off to Da-sein its authenticity and possibility, even if only that of genuinely getting 
stranded, still does not surrender it to beings which it itself is not, but forces it into its
inauthenticity, into a possible kind of being of itself.”(Heidegger 2010) 
Zahavi’s belief that socialization is a  direct introjection and internalization from an outside marks
it from Heidegger’s vantage as an inauthentic and confused self-understanding, even if we assume
with Zahavi  that  the subject is an active participant in what it takes in from others( I-Thou). 
We saw earlier how for Husserl the alterity and foreignness of other egos is constituted as a 
variation of my own thematics, via aperceptive transfer. Heidegger understands thematic mineness
through the Care structure. Heidegger says average everydayness alienates Dasein from itself, but
without Dasein’s therefore being merely conditioned by others.  
My being-with-others originates primordially as ‘my ownmost’ being-with , relative to my
significant aims and goals, to what matters to me. As the inauthentic mode of average
everydayness communication become flattened, leveled down into the vagueness of a ‘we’
understanding, but this average everydayness does not eliminate but only covers over the originary
‘mineness’ of the Care structure of primordial temporality.
The ‘solitude’ of the mineness of the self of  Dasein is disclosed most fundamentally for
Heidegger in the authentic mood of angst. Angst individualizes and thus discloses Da-sein as
"solus ipse." This existential "solipsism,"  however, is so far from transposing an isolated
subject-thing into the harmless vacuum of a  worldless occurrence that it brings Da-sein in an
extreme sense precisely before its world as world,  and thus itself before itself as
being-in-the-world.“ "Together with the sober Angst that brings us  before our individualized
potentiality-of-being, goes the unshakable joy in this possibility.”
As much as it is the case that Heidegger’s being-with-others is not the precedence of anonymous
plural self-awareness over Dasein’s ownness,  it is equally true that Dasein’s self-belonging is not 
a  retreat from the immediate contingency of  world-exposure, not the choosing of an idealist
self-actualization at the expense of  robust being with others. Gallagher and Gadamer’s readings
of Heidegger  appear to fall prey to such a solipsist interpretation.
Gallagher(2010) says:  “In Heidegger, and in thinkers who follow his line of thought, we find the
idea that a relatively complete account of our embodied, expert, enactive, pragmatic engagements
with the world can be given prior to or without reference to intersubjectivity.”
 Gadamer(2006) writes:
“Mit-sein, for Heidegger, was a concession that he had to make, but one that he never really got
behind. Indeed, even as he was developing the idea, he wasn't really talking about the other
at all. Mit-sein is, as it were, an assertion about Dasein, which must naturally take Mit-sein for
granted..."Care" [die Sorge] is always a concernfulness [ein Besorgtsein] about one's own being, and
Mit-sein is, in truth, a very weak idea of the other, more a "letting the other be" than an authentic
"being-interested-in-him."”
Zahavi, Gallagher and Gadamer are  right and wrong in their readings of Heidegger. Gallagher
and Gadamer are right that Heidegger makes their notion of  primary intersubjectivity a derivative
modification of the primary self-understanding of Dasein. But they are wrong to interpret Dasein’s
self-understanding as prior to sociality. Being-with is instead the very site of sociality as a
referential differential inside-outside. Zahavi is right that Heidegger places being-with  as prior to
Zahavi’s model of  pre-reflective self-awareness, but Zahavi is wrong in treating Das Man as an
anonymous plural self.  As a referential differential it is a more intimate notion of self- relation
than Zahavi’s present-to-hand oppositional subject-object structure. 
Heidegger’s ‘ownmost’ shows  that a profound  irreducible intimacy of relation between self and
world reveals itself once idealized binaries like inside-outside, internal-external, the meeting of an
in-itself and a for-itself have been deconstructed. A central  implication of this thinking for the
understanding of intersubjectivity is that while our experience as individuals is characterized by
stable relations of relative belonging or alienation with respect to other individuals and groups, the
site of this interactivity, whether we find ourselves in greater or lesser agreement with a world
within which we are enmeshed, has a character of peculiar self-belonging and ownership. It also
has a character of relentless creative activity that undermines and overflows attempts to
understand human action based on between-person reciprocities. We may identify to a greater or
lesser extent with various larger paradigmatic communities, delicately united by intertwining
values. But the contribution of each member of a community to the whole would not originate at
the level of spoken or bodily language interchange among voices; such constructs repress as much
as they reveal. Even in a community of five individuals in a room, I, as participant, can perceive a
locus of integrity undergirding the participation of each of the others to the responsive
conversation. In my dealings with other persons, I would be able to discern a thread of continuity
organizing their participation in dialogue with me, dictating the manner and extent to which I can
be said to influence their thinking and they mine. My thinking can not properly be seen as
`determined' by his response, and his ideas are not simply `shaped' by my contribution to our
correspondence.   
 I can only shape my actions to fit socially legitimate goals or permitted institutionalized
grammatical forms to the extent that those goals or forms can be understood by me as relevant to
my ongoing experience. Even then, what is understood by me is not `the' social forms, but aspects
hidden within these so-called forms which are unique to the totality  of relevance of my
perspective;  what I perceive as socially `permitted' rhetorical argumentation is already
stylistically distinctive in relation to what other participants perceive as permitted. Each individual
who feels belonging to an extent in a larger ethico-political collectivity perceives that collectivity's
functions in a unique, but peculiarly coherent way relative to their own history, even when they
believe that in moving forward in life their strategic language moves are guided by the constraints
imposed by essentially the `same' discursive conventions as the others in their speech community.
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